(A lightly edited translation of this Norwegian blogpost, for the benefit of my non-Norwegian students.)
About business development for platforms – and when it goes too far
A few years ago, almost all business development was about moving from selling products or individual services to becoming a partner with the customer. This development was partly driven by the need to create differentiation and connection in a world where standard services were becoming comparable and thus price-sensitive, but also enabled by technology such as CRM systems.
The next step in this evolution – an the chief aim for many companies since the early 2000s – is to try to become a platform: a service that creates value not only based on what customers can use it for, but also by having elements of network effects, so that it gets better the more customers use it. These effects can be direct – customers communicate through your platform, or indirect, in that the knowledge you gain from having many customers on the platform allows you to create services that no one else can.
Starting a platform is difficult, as you have to have something to offer your customers until the platform – preferably the other customers – is big enough or important enough to be an attraction in itself. I usually talk about having a “killer” of some kind – a feature or a group – but the easiest thing is probably to already have a network, which is why large networks like Google or Facebook buy growing networks like YouTube or Instagram.
Well. But assuming you manage to build the beginnings of a platform by setting up something, a platform, that addresses a two-part market – how do you further develop it?
Reach and range
When looking at the value of a platform, there are two dimensions that are central: Reach and range [4] – or breadth and depth, as I like to call it.
The breadth is who you can reach through the platform. It’s about both how many people use it and who the users are. It’s easy to see the number of users as the central goal here, but just as important can be who these users are. Finn.no, for example, has by far the most users in Norway, but if you’re selling used clothes, Tise is the one to go for – they don’t have as many users as Finn, but if you’re selling used fashion clothes, they have all the users that matter.
Depth is about what you can do on the platform: What services are offered. Platforms often start by offering a central service, and then expand to other things over time. Vipps, for example, had payments between private individuals as its only service to begin with, but has gradually added store payments, identification (login) and the ability to photograph bills and pay them.
Developmental problems
Business development for platforms essentially has two dimensions – and one can develop in both breadth and depth: Making the platform attractive to more customers (preferably by finding new customer groups that complement the ones you already have), or adding more and more services so that customers can eventually do everything through the platform. This increases the customers’ dependence on the platform – something that was called stickiness at least in the early days of the Internet .)
Both can be problematic.
Free until further notice
One problem that can arise is that because platforms make money from different things, their pursuit of revenue will lead to them offering for free what others make money from. Take Vipps and Finn, for example: For a period of time, Finn tried to introduce a payment service called SpID (Schibsted Payment ID) that would handle logins and payments for, among others, Aftenposten, Finn.no, VG and several other services. It was never a success, but at least it got Vipps to keep its prices down and invite cooperation with many other providers.
Finn has had greater success observing what other competitors are doing, and then offering the same to its customers, either by developing it itself, or by acquiring or forming alliances with startups that make the Finn platform better.
Companies that have not been successful here include Telenor, which has tried many things to get greater profitability out of its expensive and extensive networks, only to find itself forced back into cost competition for basic traffic. While Telenor had the resources, it could have built up a range of services – alarm systems, health applications, video conferencing, entertainment – but it did not have the appetite for such large investments outside its core business. It had also burned through a number of investments in entertainment, where the fact that Telenor was big in Norway was of no consequence to the big entertainment producers, who negotiate prices for content all over the world. Today, Telenor – like most telecommunications companies – is a shadow of its former self, reduced to delivering basic services from an eighth of its formidable headquarters in Fornebu.
Enshittification

Another problem with platform business development is a phenomenon called (it was actually the word of the year in the US in 2023) enshittification . The term was coined by Cory Doctorow , first in an article in Wired [1], then in an excellent follow-up in the Financial Times [2]. (Cory is, by the way, a Canadian early Internet activist, best-selling author, and brilliant speaker who I (ahem) once knew and hosted when he gave a talk in Oslo .)
In short, enshittification is about platform providers, in an attempt to increase and maintain their profits, luring new user groups by selling the user groups they already have, and then repeating the process when the newest user group has become dependent on the platform.
Or, as Cory puts it :
Here is how platforms die: First, they are good to their users; then they abuse their users to make things better for their business customers; finally, they abuse those business customers to claw back all the value for themselves. Then, they die.
Facebook is a typical example: Initially a place you went to talk to friends and connections, which has now become a hodgepodge of content and ads you don’t want, crowding out what you really want, since it doesn’t pay.
Balance in everything
Marketing is about creating and retaining customers. The problem for platforms is that it is not always clear who the customers are, as they are often faced with two-sided markets [3,5] (seller and buyer, for example) where one side generates most – often all – of the revenue. This can make it difficult, especially in times of recession, to maintain the interests of the customer group that does not generate revenue over time. However, this balance between long-term thinking and short-term profit is nothing new to business development in general – how much quality to put into product and customer service, for example, has always been there as a balance to deal with.
So, by all means, increase the breadth and depth of what you do with your platform, but don’t forget the reason customers came there in the first place – to get a basic function performed, and, to a large extent, to relate to each other.
References:
[1] C. Doctorow, “The ‘Enshittification’ of TikTok,” Wired . Accessed: Oct. 03, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.wired.com/story/tiktok-platforms-cory-doctorow/
[2] C. Doctorow, “’Enshittification’ is coming for absolutely everything,” Financial Times , Feb. 08, 2024. Accessed: Oct. 03, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.ft.com/content/6fb1602d-a08b-4a8c-bac0-047b7d64aba5
[3] T. Eisenmann, G. Parker, and MWV Alstyne, “ Strategies for two-sided markets ,” Harvard Business Review , vol. 84, no. 10, pp. 92–101, 2006.
[4] Ø. Fjeldstad and E. Andersen, ” Casting off the chains: Value shops and value networks ,” European Business Forum , no. 14, pp. 47–53, Summer 2003.
[5] G. Parker and M. Van Alstyne, “Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design,” Management Science , vol. 10, pp. 1494–1504, 2005.
